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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Dividend behaviour has extensively been reviewed by many researchers from time 
to time across different countries. Empirical evidences observed in most of the studies 
reveal equivocal results about dividend theories [Bhattacharyya (2007)]. Since, in 
absence of any unanimous findings, need for future research has not been restricted, 
theoretically. In developing countries like Pakistan, where limited research is available on 
corporate dividend policy, need for future research is more looked for. Most of the 
available research papers, address only firm specific determinants of dividend policy.  Do 
macroeconomic variables influence corporate financing decisions? The need to address 
this question is the prime motive of this research paper.  Major objective of this paper is 
to observe dividend behaviour of listed firms in Pakistan under monetary policy 
restrictions and this is the first attempt of its kind in Pakistan to the best of my 
Knowledge.  This study is very relevant in present scenario since State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP) has been persistently pursuing restricted monetary policy since 2005 to control 
inflation. 
Miller and Modigliani are the focal names when we start thinking about dividend 
theories. MM theory of irrelevance, as quoted by Van Horne (1998), based upon 
assumption of perfect capital market, states that dividend policy has no affect upon value 
of the firm. Nonetheless, when markets are not perfect, as it is, dividend policy does 
matter and affect value of the firm as both managers and investor favour dividend 
payments as validated by many researchers. 
 
2.  MONETARY POLICY IN PAKISTAN 
Pakistan is an emerging economy. After deregulation and privatisation, in 1990s, 
studying macro variables is of paramount importance and interest. Pakistan started 
liberalisation of the economy and also adopted market based monetary policy system. 
Main motive of monetary policy is to ensure low inflation along with sustainable 
economic growth. It regulates cost and allocates money and credit in the economy. 
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Before liberalisation, interest rates were used to be fixed by the regulatory bodies 
whereas after liberalisation, State Bank of Pakistan’s (SBP) open market operation is 
announced to be the major instrument of monetary policy in 1995.  
In year 2001, although Pakistan put efforts to bring macroeconomic fundamentals 
back on track its monetary policy had to be tempered due to conflicting economic goals. In 
overall terms monetary policy remained tight in year 2001 [SBP (2001)]. Macroeconomic 
discipline achieved in year 2001 led to easing of monetary policy in year 2002. Trade 
deficit was much lower than year 2001 and inflation was down to 3.5 percent [SBP (2002)]. 
Year 2003 again witnessed strong boost   rising real GDP growth to 5.1 percent level.  The 
scale and depth of improvement in year 2003 is much higher than year 2002. SBP increased 
market liquidity by lowering discount rate substantially [SBP (2003)]. 
Year 2004 again witnessed loose monetary stance being adopted by SBP since 
couple of years.  It not only led to an immense increase in aggregate demand along with 
increase in real GDP growth to over 6 percent but also contributed to growing 
inflationary pressures in the country [SBP(2004)]. In year 2005 there is an important 
transition in monetary policy i.e. from accommodative to aggressive tightening, although 
SBP had started raising benchmark interest rates early in year 2004. Inflation was the 
main driving force behind this move [SBP(2005)]. This move continued in year 2006 
although the chief policy variable, i.e. discount rate remained same. However, State bank 
focused on draining excess liquidity from the market [SBP(2006)]. 
In order to temperate demand pressures in the country, SBP sustained tight 
monetary policy in year 2007 [SBP(2007)].  Increased inflationary pressures led SBP to 
continue this policy in year 2008 and 2009 also [SBP(2008) and SBP (2009)].   
 
3.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Starting from John Lintner (1956), noticeable work upon dividend behaviour and 
policy has been carried out in different parts of the world. Lintner, in his research to 
know how firms decide to distribute their earnings revealed that current earnings and 
lagged dividends the foremost factors to be considered in dividend decisions. He 
surveyed 600 firms and on basis of interviews of officials developed a model and tested 
further. Results also reveal that firms tend towards their target payout ratios by partial 
adjustments reflecting soothing behaviour. 
Following Lintner, many researchers explored other dividend determinants by 
extending/modifying Lintner’s model. Dividend policies of individual firms were studied 
by Fama and Babiak (1968) by modifying Lintner’s model. They deleted constant and 
added lagged profits in the model. Al-Najjar (2009) studied dividend behaviour of 
Jordanian firms and found that factors affecting dividend policy in developed countries 
are same as in case of Jordan. Results of his study also validated Lintner’s Model. Author 
used Pooled and Panel logit and tobit models on 86 non-financial listed companies. 
Ahmed and Javaid (2009) observed determinants of dividend policy in Pakistan along 
with testing of Lintner’s model of dividend soothing using panel data of 320 non-
financial firms. Results reveal that firms rely, mainly, on current earnings and past 
dividends for dividend decisions along with instability towards dividend soothing. 
Do foreign affiliates of a multinational firm depict same dividend behaviour like of 
a parent company to its common shareholders? Interesting work completed by Desai, et 
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al. (2001), reveals that majority-owned foreign affiliates of American companies portray 
same dividend policy as of domestic companies paying dividends to diffused common 
shareholders. Musa and Fodio (2009) by using a model developed by Musa, studied 
dividend behaviour of Nigerian firms revealing that previous dividend, current earnings, 
cash flow, investment and net current assets have significant impact on dividend policy. 
Dividend stability has been observed by Al-Yahyaee, et al. (2010) in Oman by working 
on a selected sample firms using Lintner’s model. 
Eriotis (2005) examined, in Greece, the effects of distributed earnings, size of the 
firm and changes in dividend and distributed earnings from the last year. Data comprises 
of a sample of 149 firms for a period of 5 years. Firms prefer to distribute each year a 
rather constant dividend, by adjusting to distributed earnings and size. 
Abor and Bopkin (2010) observed effects of investment opportunities and some 
other financial variables including some macro variables (inflation rate and GDP) as 
control variables. Study is based upon a sample of 34 emerging market countries, 
including Pakistan, for a period of 17 years from 1990–2006. Authors observed 
significant relationship between potential investment opportunity and dividend policy. 
Rozeff (1982) studied impact of agency costs, Beta (a proxy for financial and operating 
leverage) and growth of a firm, upon dividend policy. He observed significant results for 
all these variables. 
Dividend behaviour similarity between US firms and developing countries (eight 
emerging markets including Pakistan), observed by Aivazian, et al. (2003). However, 
sensitivity of variables differs as country specific situations may effect.  Interesting result 
is that in emerging markets, firms found to give higher dividend payments than US firms, 
although these face more financial constraints, relatively. Garrett and Priestly (2000) 
worked on aggregate stock market data of US firms with extended Lintner model and 
claimed that target dividends are a function of permanent earnings and lagged prices. 
They introduced new model which assumes that managers tend to minimise costs while 
pursuing for target dividends. Regarding Signalling theory, authors concluded that 
dividends signal about positive shocks to current permanent earnings and not to future 
permanent earnings. 
Bhattacharyya, et al. (2008) worked in a different dimension on a hypothesis that 
high quality agents (managers) have access to more positive NPV projects rather than 
low quality agents. High quality agent demands higher compensation. Model based upon 
this hypothesis, had been tested for Canadian firms over the period from 1993-95 using 
tobit regression analysis. Canadian firms found to support this hypothesis. 
Some authors have worked, specifically, on dividend determinants related to 
ownership of firms. In Pakistan, ownership structure has significant impact upon 
dividend payout policy where as cash flows have insignificant impact. It is finding of a 
study by Afza and Mirza (2010), upon 100 companies listed at KSE. Board of directors 
act as a tool to monitor management and hence helps to resolve agency problems. 
However, composition of board does matter and have influence on dividend policy 
accordingly. In same way ownership structure also dominates corporate decisions 
involving voting requirements. Higher the concentration of ownership, higher will be 
chances of exploitation of minority shareholder’s rights.  Abdelsalam, et al. (2008) 
examined above both elements in Egypt for a pooled data of 50 firms for three years 
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using logit and tobit models. He found significant association between institutional 
ownership and dividend policy and insignificant for board composition. 
In family controlled firms, independent directors have significant impact on 
dividend policy. Atmaja (2010) observed this finding in his study upon Australian firms 
over the period from 2002-2005 using panel (random effects) regression. Pandy (2001) 
observed sensitivity of dividend behaviour of Malaysian firms, using multi-logit analysis, 
to changes in earnings. In addition to observe sensitivity, application of Lintner’s 
framework depicted less stable dividend policies. Four possible behaviours i.e.: (a) 
omission; (b) decrease; (c) increase; and (d) no change, observed to three possible 
changes in earnings i.e. (increase, decrease and negative earnings). 
Not only internal but external factors, like monetary policy, do affect financial 
decisions of the firms. Pandey and Bhat (2007) observed, in India, that monetary policies 
have significant influence upon dividend behaviour and 5 percent to 6 percent reduction 
observed in payout. Authors tested extended Lintner’s model using GMM estimator for 
data of 571 firms over a period of 8 years. Ameer (2008) worked out upon determinants 
of dividend policy of Malaysian Banks. He used ordered probit modelling technique, in 
addition to check speed of adjustment through Lintner model, to check flexibility of 
dividend policy to certain variables. In addition to firm specific, author observed 
monetary policy effects on dividend payout.  
Goddard, et al. (2006) tested smoothing and signalling hypothesis upon 137 UK 
firms, over the period from 1970 to 2003. He observed contemporary relationship 
between dividends, prices and earnings. Some evidence in favour of both hypotheses has 
been revealed by causality tests. 
Hussainey and Eisa (2009) in addition to work on dividend signalling hypothesis 
also included signalling behaviour of voluntary disclosure statements incorporated in 
annual reports. By using event study methodology, they observed behaviour of 33 UK 
non-financial firms after a decline in their sustained earnings growth. Findings do not 
support dividend signalling hypothesis however support disclosure signalling behaviour. 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) examined signalling hypothesis and revealed, empirically, that 
dividend changes signal profitability level in subsequent years. 
Bhattacharyya (2007) argues continuity of search for more elucidations as he 
observed equivocal empirical results of dividend theories. He collected empirical work 
done based upon clientele, signalling and agency hypothesis and extracted stylised facts 
also.  
Dividend policies are affected by legal corporate framework of a particular 
country. Countries having better legal protection for minority shareholders, observe 
higher payouts. Porta, et al. quoted their findings by doing empirical work over a cross 
section of 4000 firms of 33 countries.  
Baker and Wurgler (2004) introduced catering theory of dividend. Authors 
proposed that when investors pay premium on stock price, they, infact, anticipate 
dividends and managers cater to them by paying dividends and vice versa. Empirical 
findings confirm to their theory. 
In addition to explicit claims, there are implicit claims, upon an organisation, by 
non-investor stakeholders (e.g. employees, customers, vendors etc.). These stakeholders 
may suffer costs if a firm runs out of business i.e. cost of jobs search by employees, 
increased maintenance costs for customers etc. Firms offering more implicit guarantees 
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are more valued. These have to maintain higher liquidity levels to pay off potential 
implicit claims. Hence being more conservative, trying to avoid from financial distress, 
use more equity. Dividend payout is less in these firms. Although this stakeholder’s 
theory is not very persuasive as firms maintaining this level of excellence earn higher 
profits and hence higher payouts. Holder, et al. (1998) tested this theory and validated 
existence of this relationship. 
Michel (1979) observed industry impact upon dividend policy in United States. 
There are similarities in structural characteristics of firms of an industry. Hence, different 
industries would have varying influences upon dividend policies as would have different 
investment opportunities. Empirical results, concluded by Michel (1979), confirm the 
assumption. 
 
4.  MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
The Lintner dividend model can be assumed as the mother of all dividend 
behaviour models. Almost all researches on dividend behaviour are based upon this 
model, modified model or its enhanced versions and the same practice would be followed 
by us. However, our study focuses on dividend payment behaviour of Pakistani firms in 
tight monetary policy regime. In perfect capital market, as Miller and Modigliani 
proposed, cost of internally generated and external funds would not be different. But we 
are living in imperfect world and hence above proposition would not stand valid. There 
would be an information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. A moral hazard of 
default would prevail. Investors have to incur project monitoring costs and also demand 
risk premium, hence cost of external funds will be greater than internal funds. At times of 
restricted monetary policy, cost of external funds increases and firms prefer to utilise 
internal funds provided that firms have investment opportunities.  To maintain internal 
reserves, for internal financing, dividend payout decreases.  Although firms may go for 
external financing (debt), in case of monetary policy restriction, if it has yet to attain 
optimum level of capital structure and want to gain tax benefits of interest expense.  
 
Below mentioned is our proposed replicated model of Pandey and Bhat (2007).  
                                   (     )       (     )     
       
   = Dividend for firm i in time t 
 
 
Cost of funds rises. (Restricted monetary policy) 
Dividend Payout Decreases 
51:4, 688 Ashraf and Mohsin 
 
   = Earnings (net profit) of firm i in time t 
     = Dividend in lagged year 1 
     = Dividend in lagged year 2 
   = Monetary restriction in year t– A dummy variable.  
   accounts for individual firm effect while    measures time-based effect. Earning is 
a major and dominant dividend determinant for every firm. Lagged dividends, do have impact 
upon dividend payout as firms tend to move gradually to target dividends i.e. dividend 
soothing. Pandey and Bhat (2007) used two lagged periods rather one.  Monetary restriction is 
a dummy variable with value 1 in case of tight monetary policy and zero (0) otherwise. 
Identifying monetary policy with a only one variable, like discount rate, lending rates or 
money supply may not be very explanatory. Furthermore, in Pakistan monetary policy 
announcements are twice and thrice times a year from 2006 onwards and concluding a policy 
for whole year may be difficult.  Hence, rather using, discount rate, lending rates or money 
supply etc. we use State Bank of Pakistan’s Annual reports for identification of restricted 
monetary policies in respective years. In annual reports, a single line sentence, describing 
overall monetary policy stance in that particular year, is available. From year 2001 to 2009, 
monetary policy is loose only in three years from 2002 to 2004. 
Balanced panel data of 900 observations (100 cross section firms for 9 years) is 
being used in estimation of above model. Unlike cross section or time series, panel data 
encompass certain advantages. Gujrati (2003) has cited these advantages quoted by 
Baltagi (1995). Panel data takes heterogeneity into account through individual firm 
effect. A combination of cross section and time series observations give more rich 
information, more variability, less collinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom 
and more efficiency. Panel data better detects and measures effects that are not 
observable in pure cross section or time series. The dynamics of change are better 
observed through panel data as repeated cross sections of observation are studied. In our 
estimation model, panel data would also serve best to study effect of monetary policy 
restrictions over the years and the dynamics of change in dividend payments. 
 
4.1.  Hypothesis 
                                
                                
Above proposed is a dynamic model with lagged dependent variable as 
explanatory variable. Dynamic models are bit difficult to estimate.  Dynamic models 
estimation is recommended through usage of GMM estimator as literature enforces it. 
 
5.  SAMPLE AND DATA 
A sample of 100 firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange has been selected.  To 
ensure equal participation of each industry, in sample, equal sample size (proportionately 
to respective population size) from each group has been selected. Source of panel data for 
the period of 2001-2009, is State Bank of Pakistan. 
For industry classification, State bank’s classification, based upon economic 
grouping, has been used. State Bank of Pakistan has classified firms in nine economic 
groups based upon logical similarity in nature of business. Only non-financial firms are 
 Monetary Policy Restriction and Dividend Behaviour of Pakistani Firms  51:4, 689 
 
 
being analysed like did by [Porta, et al. (2000); Rozeff (1982); Ahmed and Javaid (2009); 
Al-Najjar (2009); Musa and Fodio (2009); Hussainey and Eisa (2009)]. Financial 
structure of financial firms is considerably different from non-financial firms. Regulatory 
restrictions on financial firms influence their financing decisions and these restrictions 
affect financial firms’ more than non-financial firms. Like in case of banks, these are 
bound to maintain a minimum capital adequacy ratio at all times, under prudential 
regulations, and it influence their financing decision.  Ogler and Taggart (1983), cited in 
Ameer (2008), p.1], empirically observed this later mentioned finding. 
Exclusion of Firms owned by State (wholly or partially, as best we can identify) as 
their financing decisions may have been affected due to government influence. This 
practice also adopted by other researchers like Porta, et al. (2000); Afza and Mirza 
(2010). 
In order to be more pragmatic, factors, which may create biasness in research 
findings and hamper explanatory power of our explanatory variables, have been 
considered while sample selection.  Very small firms having net sales less than PKR 100 
million, firms having negative net worth in more than one year, with unavailable data for 
one or more consecutive years, in losses for more than one consecutive year and those 
without dividend information are excluded. Pandey and Bhat (2007) also applied few of 
these criteria while sample selection. Consideration of losses and negative net worth is 
due to the fact that dividends are basically a primary function of an organisation’s 
profitability and net worth. Firms, with better dividend payment record, have been 
preferred in sample. Musa and Fodio (2009) also quoted Kumar and Lee (2001) in favour 
of above point that reason for dropping zero dividend payout firms is that relative 
performance evaluation of dividend model is meaningless for such firms. Exclusion of 
negative worth firms also supports this logic as firms facing losses will definitely not be 
able to pay dividend and to check these firms in model will be meaningless. Afza and 
Mirza (2010) also have qualification that firms should not have missed dividend payment 
in more than one year and firms should not be in losses. Care has been taken to take into 
account those firms which are also part of KSE 30 or 100 index so that sample should 
represent maximum of the market capitalisation. 
 
Table 1 
Sample Selection Criteria 
Sample Size 100 firms. Equal sample size from each industry (proportionate to 
their respective population size) 
Study Period 2001–2009 
Criteria Non-financial firms 
Excluding very small firms (having net sales less than 100 million) 
Excluding firms having negative net worth in more than one year 
Excluding firms with unavailable data for one or more consecutive 
years 
Excluding firms in losses for more than one consecutive 
Selection of firms with preferably better dividend payment record 
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6.  RESULTS 
Table 2, below, provides summary of descriptive statistics of earnings and 
dividends. There is an increasing trend in profits and dividends over the period of time as 
evident from their mean values. There is more variability in earnings as compared to 
dividends. Mean payout ratio prevails around 50 percent with less variability (standard 
deviation about 13 percent). 
 
Table 2 
Year 
Earnings (PKR Millions) Dividends (PKR Million) Payout 
(%) Mean Stdev Max Min Mean Stdev Max Min 
2001 299 1,162 10,859 –1.357 165 527 4,513 0 55% 
2002 314 900 7,287 –2,649 226 930 8,794 0 72% 
2003 397 786 6,102 –125 239 719 6,249 0 60% 
2004 499 894 5,588 –22 225 602 4,282 0 45% 
2005 647 1,161 7,855 –2 228 626 4,751 0 35% 
2006 750 1,359 7,558 –321 351 1,006 6,927 0 47% 
2007 794 1,686 10,597 –570 287 688 4,441 0 36% 
2008 620 3,027 19,655 –14,745 334 907 6,785 0 54% 
2009 644 1,701 9,415 –5,587 450 1,178 8,923 0 70% 
All Years 552 690,98 19,655 –14,745 278 217,027 8,923 0 50% 
 
Table 3 depicts estimation results. Model 1 is fixed effects model (cross section 
fixed). Significant results for earnings and lagged dividend (1) have been observed at p-
value of less than 1 percent. A coefficient of One lagged year dividend has greater influence 
upon dividend payment rather current earnings where as interactive variable of monetary 
restriction and lagged dividends have mixed and insignificant results. Coefficient of 
determination has significant value of 0.71. In model 2, random effects approach has been 
used. Here lagged dividend has significant results with coefficient of 0.72 at p-value of less 
than 1 percent. Current earnings have, comparatively, less coefficient value of 0.06 but also 
insignificant at 10 percent. Monetary restriction interactive variable 1, like in fixed effect 
model has also negative coefficient but insignificant as p-value is higher, even than 10 
percent. Surprisingly, second monetary restriction interactive variable has positive 
coefficient along with significant results at 5 percent.  
Model 3 comprises of GMM estimation, which is urged, in dynamic panels. Our 
model is also a dynamic one. Lagged dependent variable may create biasness and GMM 
can manage it well. GMM estimation requires instruments and we have used explanatory 
variables as instruments. Results reveal almost similar trends like in models 1 and 2. Both 
earnings and one year lagged dividend have significant coefficient values at p-value of 1 
percent. Lagged dividend coefficient has higher value than of earnings. Monetary 
restriction interactive variable, again in this model, has negative coefficient supporting 
the hypothesis but is insignificant even at p-value of higher than 10 percent. Second 
lagged dividend is appeared with negative coefficient although insignificant. MR1 has 
negative coefficient but insignificant and surprisingly MR2 has positive coefficient and 
significant at p-value of 1 percent. Results of all four models portray a very similar and 
significant finding that first lagged dividend has a significant and highest positive impact 
upon dividend decision of firms in Pakistan. Current year earnings do have a positive and 
significant impact  but  follow the last year dividend in dividend  decision.  Due to  mixed 
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Table 3 
Variable 
Model 1 
FEM 
Model 2 
REM 
Model 3 
GMM 
Eit 0.021* 0.066*** 0.203* 
t-value 6.593 1.717 6.590 
p-value 0.000 0.086 0.000 
Dit–1 0.353* 0.725* 0.626* 
t-value 4.846 7.043 9.092 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Dit–2 0.059 0.014 –0.040 
t-value 1.030 –0.135 –0.543 
p-value 0.303 0.893 0.586 
MRtDit–1 –0.052 –0.179 –0.212 
t-value –0.675 –0.700 –1.177 
p-value 0.499 0.484 0.239 
MRtDit–2 0.056 0.395** 0.350* 
t-value 0.765 1.925 2.366 
p-value 0.444 0.055 0.018 
R
2
 0.714 0.721 0.672 
Adjusted R
2
 0.664 0.719 0.670 
Durbin–Watson  2.288 2.212 
Prob (F-Statistics)  0.000  
J-Statistic   5.28E 
*Significant at 1 percent or less. ** Significant at 5 percent.  *** Significant at 10 percent. 
 
results and insignificant value for second lagged dividend variable, we can claim that 
monetary restriction does not have any significant bearing on dividend decisions of 
Pakistani firms although theory is opposite to the results. Coefficients of lagged dividend 
in all models range from 0.3 to 0.7. In model 4 value is 0.626 with adjustment parameter 
(1-0.62) = 0.38. Target payout ratio (0.20/0.38) is 53 percent. Firms seem to observe 
stable dividend policies. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
Observing effect of monetary policy on dividend behaviour is of paramount 
importance and to best of our knowledge, it is first study of its kind in Pakistan. 
Lintner’s model has been used to test dividend stability. For dynamic model 
estimation, GMM is strongly recommended method of estimation and same has been 
used in addition to fixed effects and random effect models.  Pakistani firms have been 
observed to follow relatively stable dividend policies. Firms have moderate target 
payout ratios and adjustment factors. One year lagged dividends have strongest 
influence upon dividend decisions followed by current earnings. Insignificant results 
of monetary restriction variable do not claim any effect on dividend decisions of 
Pakistani firms. Although second monetary interactive variable has positive 
coefficient in GMM estimation but results of first MR interactive variable and second 
lagged dividend variable lead to the above conclusion. 
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